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MINUTES 
UTAH SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Wednesday, September 23,2009 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
Francis M. Wikstrom, Presiding 
PRESENT: Francis M. Wikstrom, Trystan B. Smith, Francis J. Carney, Barbara L. Townsend, 
Honorable Reuben J. Renstrom, Leslie W. Slaugh, Terrie T. Mcintosh, David W. 
Scofield, Lori Woffinden, Honorable Derrek P. Pullan, Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson, Jonathan O. Hafen, Steven Marsden, James T. Blanch, Lincoln L. 
Davies, Todd M. Shaughnessy, W. Cullen Battle 
ABSENT: Thomas R. Lee, Judge David O. Nuffer, Judge Anthony B. Quinn, Anthony W. 
Scofield, Janet H. Smith 
STAFF: Timothy M. Shea, Sammi V, Anderson 
GUESTS: Angela Fonnesbeck (Family Law Section), Stewart Ralphs (Family Law Section) 
Ms. Fonnesbeck and Mr. Ralphs attended the meeting to discuss a potential rule 
requiring basic financial disclosures at the outset of family law cases. 
Tom Brunker (AG's Office), Rick Schwermer (AOC), Kirk Torgensen (AG's 
Office), Mark Fields (AOC) 
Mr. Brunker, Mr. Schwermer, Mr. Torgensen and Mr. Fields attended the meeting 
to discuss proposed changes to Rule 65C (Post-Conviction Reviews in Capital 
Cases). 
I. APPROVAL OF MINUTES. 
Mr. Wikstrom called the meeting to order at 4:00 p.m., and entertained comments from 
the committee concerning the June 24,2009 minutes. No comments were made and Mr. 
Wikstrom asked for a motion that the minutes be approved. The motion was duly made and 
seconded, and unanimously approved. 
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IL INTRODUCTION OF NEW MEMBERS AND SAMMI ANDERSON. 
Mr. Wikstrom introduced Judge Reuben Renstrom and Trystan Smith as new members of 
the committee. The new members made the appropriate disclosures as required by the Supreme 
Court Rules. Mr. Wikstrom also introduced Sammi Anderson as the new secretary for the 
committee. 
IH. RULE 108. DISCLOSURES IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS PROCEEDINGS. 
Ms. Fonnesbeck, current chair of the Family Law Section, and Mr. Stewart Ralphs 
represented the Family Law Section in a discussion regarding the need for basic initial 
disclosures in domestic proceedings. Proposed Rule 108 is the product of discussion and 
comment from the Family Law Section over the course of the last 18 months. 
Ms. Fonnesbeck and Mr. Ralphs emphasized the prevalence of pro se litigants and 
mandatory mediation in domestic proceedings. They expressed the view that basic mandatory 
disclosures regarding income and assets would facilitate early resolution of many domestic 
cases. 
Mr. Slaugh and Mr. Scofield noted that disclosures regarding one party's ownership 
interest in a business entity require special treatment so that the interest of the entity in 
safeguarding confidential business information is also protected. Mr. Slaugh proposed 
compromise language based on whether the party to the proceeding has control over the entity. 
Mr. Wikstrom asked that any language changes be sent to Tim Shea. Mr. Shea suggested the 
Rule be called Rule 26(a) rather than Rule 108. 
IV. RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION REVIEWS IN CAPITAL CASES. 
Mr. Wikstrom introduced the proposed amendment to Rule 65C governing post-
conviction relief. Reference was made to a September 14,2009 letter to the committee from 
Representative Kay L. Mclff. Mr. Wikstrom discussed efforts, led by the Attorney General's 
office, to amend the Utah State Constitution to provide that post-conviction remedies be 
governed by statute, notwithstanding any other law. It was ultimately decided that an 
amendment to Rule 65C, in conjunction with statutory amendments to the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act ("PCRA"), would be a more prudent alternative. The proposed amendment is the 
compromise effort of an informal task force including members of the Attorney General's office, 
the defense bar, Representative Mclff, academics, representatives from the Administrative Office 
of the Courts and Mr. Wikstrom as Chair of the committee. 
Mr, Wikstrom reported that the compromise in the proposed amendment has been 
approved by the Attorney General's office and participating defense counsel. Mr. Slaugh 
questioned the necessity of a sentence in subparagraph (a) to summarize the PCRA. Mr. Brunker 
from the Attorney General's office responded the language is included to ensure this area of law 
is governed by statute, the PCRA, not older common law. 
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Ihe committee first discussed depositions. Mr. Slaugh expressed the view that many 
eases require fewer depositions than are taken and approved of the concept that depositions be 
limited by nuniber of hours, rather than by number of separate depositions. Mr. Hafen expressed. 
caution in setting the deposition hour limit too low and emphasized the need to let lawyers 
handle their cases efficiently and as they see fit. Mr. Hafen advocated to allow the parties and 
lawyers decide how to divide up the total number of deposition hours, with the caveat that party 
depositions are limited to 7 hours and non-party depositions to 4 hours. The committee was 
unanimous that each side should have 20 hours for depositions, to be divided up as the sides so 
choose, with party depositions limited to 7 hours and non-partv depositions limited to 4 hours. 
* ^ . | Discussion tol i t as to the 
. ' i cumcj i" * \-iUi- -^.K.i^Ln^ A ; . U ; , U tney siiould be prohibited. Mr. Slaugh 
d that contention interrogatories are useful to flesh out affirmative defenses identified by 
the oiher ^ide Mr. Hafen suggested limiting interrogatories t<* 1 .> per side and allowing parties 
to use those interrogatories as contention interrogatories if they are so inclined. Mr. Shea 
emphasized that the default limits proposed by the committee are not binding. If the parties and 
lawyers believe they require additional discovery, and if the budget for that discovery has been 
presented to and approved by the parties, the court should permit discovery beyond the default 
limits. The committee was unanimous that each side should get ! 5 interrogatories, to be used as 
contention interrogatories or otherwise. 
The committee then considered requests for production "K Is. 1 0"w nsend expressed a 
desire to maintain consistency. Mr. Wikstrom responded there is currently no limit on requests 
for production. The committee discussed various proposed limits and concerns associated with 
drafting and interpreting requests for production too narrowly or too broadly. Mr. Scofield 
expressed a concern regarding whether responsive documents must be identified as responsive to 
particular requests for production. Mr. Smith discussed concern regarding how requests for 
production would be divided among multiple parties on the same side. Judge Anderson noted 
the court 's role in determining whether parties "on the same side* are sufficiently aov: rse thai 
they warrant separate discovery limits. The committee decided that each side should I :ivc 7 
requests for production. The committee declined to add any language as to requiring mat 
responsive documents be made to correspond with particular requests for production 
I "he committee next turned to requests for admission. Mr. Slaugh indicated requests for 
admission are useful for authenticating documents and Judge Anderson noted his observation 
that requests for admission are used effectively in collections cases. Mr. Hafen suggested a limit 
of 25 . I he committee unanimously approved a limit of 25 requests for admission per side. 
Mr. Wikstrom then introduced the topic of timing for the requisite disclosures Mr. Shea 
suggested that Plaintiff be required to make the requisite disclosures 14 days after Defendant 
files an Answer. The committee approved this suggestion. Mr. Shea discussed keying the 
deadline for Defendant 's disclosures to Plaint i ffs disclosures. The committee agreed, 
Defendant 's disclosures will be due 28 days after Plaintiff's disclosures are made. Ms 
Townsend raised the issue as to what will happen when multiple defendants are served at 
different times. Judge Anderson was not troubled by this as later served defendants always have 
these kinds of issues to address. Mr. Wikstrom proposed that Defendant 's disclosures be due 28 
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later. Fhe commit tee agreed. 
Judge M a n inquired as to whether Plaintiff would >uffer a penalty if Plaintiff failed to 
make disclosures within 14 days The commit tee discussed several opt ions, including d i s m i s s ! 
without prejudice, Rule 37 sanctions, al lowing a motion to dismiss by Defendant, etc. Mr. 
Wikstrom and Mr. Marsden proposed that n o party be permitted to take additional discovery 
until after their own disclosures filed. The committee approved this suggestion. 
! he commit!-, the n discussed what would happen once the parties'* requisi te disclosures 
are made . Mr. Wiks t rom i ais I the possibili ty of requiring attorneys to meet and confer to agree 
on additional d iscover) ' 'I h = • :• : in in titt $ s- 2: ::]:: 1 • ssed concerns that a t torneys d o n ' t general ly mee t 
and confer. Mr. Haf t nsi igg 1 st : • i th* .tth :=: • :! : fz ;i lit 2 .ssumption be that the matter is trial ready and 
no additional discovery is needed unless parties stipulate otherwise or one part}' req K ^ 
additional discovery. The committee agreed, '""!l I: $• : nt st ilahon or motion ibr additiona 
discovery, courts should expect a pre-trial order at 1 :1 s :r ! e. The committee agreed that 
150 days after first Defendant's disclosures, fact dis : :: mourned closed absent 
stipulation or request for additional discovery, A pie tK~* v ^ , ^ w.wv ««J trial date can be 
initiated by the court or on request of the parties, 
Significant discussion regarding the scope vi u> ,, • . uage i'u. -
emphasized access to justice, especially for smaller a need to v '; IK. 
judiciary on the proportionality of cases, fe, amount in controversy vis a vis costs o; rry, 
so that courts are more willing to cut discovers off in low value cases. Multiple committee 
members expressed their opinion that the scope of discovery issue v\ ill depend entireK on 
courts' willingness to enforce the restrictions. 
Mr. Wikstrom then .asked what role Rule 35 examinations should have in the i nitial 
phase of discovery. Mr. Carney addressed the different perspectives held by the plaintiff and 
defense bars. Mr. Smith discussed the significant costs associated with the examination. Judge 
Pullan suggested that once fact discovery is closed, judges be involved in a proportionality 
review before expert discovery, including the Rule 35 examination, is undertaken. The 
committee further discussed whether Rule 35 should be revised to treat the independent medical 
examination just as other experts are treated Mr. Carney expressed his opinion thai independen: 
medical examinations are treated differently by the rules onl> because they evolved at J titr 
when expert, practice other than independent medical examimMoi wis n-»i evtensivc-
\ It* Wikstrom emphasized that the first two phases, requisite disclosures am*, i.irgeto -
discovery, are confined to fact discovery. The committee turned to expert discover) Mi 
Carney suggested that the party bearing the burden of proof have ~»0 days after the do «.- 01 
discovery to submit expert report(s). Rebuttal reports will be due 30 da\ s later. The * onum • =.. 
agreed. The committee further agreed that there be no expert depositions and that experts not be 
permitted to exceed the scope of their reports at trial. 
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Mr. Wikstrom noted KcprcM/niati\e Mcitf ^ di -^c .<:. -c undefined, limited 
area where the Court reserves the i ight to exercise its discretion m mis area. Judge Pullan 
(,uo-.!..»ned representatives from the Attorney General's office whether the Attorney General is 
takn ;. the position that Courts have no common law authority to set aside a conviction. Ju^*, 
Pullan sought assurances that the Court's discretion to act in egregious circumstance is 
preserved under the proposed amendment Mr. Brunker and Mr. Torgeson assured Judge Pullan 
that it was not the intention of the Attorney General to foreclose the Court from granting relief 
outside the PCRA in appropriate circumstances. Judge Pullan emphasized his view Inat the 
courts must have the ability to correct egregious injustices through the writ process and indicated 
his support for the proposed amendment only so long as that ability is preserved to the judiciary. 
Judge Pullan was assured by those representative^ nf thr Attorney General's office present that 
courts would retain that ability, 
Mr. Slaugh moved the approval of the amendment. \ \ Battle seconded. The motiui* 
was unanimously approved. Publication will happen on an expedited basis. 
'i ' I I \ l • ACTION ON RULES 5b, ' • •• I RACT OF J* » « ; V H A - \ •• . 
' II II I" I ' Il 11 II rDGE AS A MA . . ~ i . U l Aii^ ** * , . 
* i; ^ i. J, oI these proposed amendments have been published for 
• • MI f : ' - ! 4 to clarify existing language and the process for 
cu ^ an ^ Vfc Woffinden whether there was any need 
IO have the abstract attested under oath, Ms. W J) indicated there is no need, that the Clerk 
can sign under seai of the court The committee unanimoush approved the amendment to the 
Rule with the change to allow the Clerk to sign under the sei<1 of ?»ic court. 
As for Rule 63A, the Committee considered LOinmenb uia: the Rule :>iiouiu ,*j
 r i 
part\ actions. Mr. Shea and Mr, Wikstrom explained that the amendment is intended io L ,
 ( 
that parties in one-action proceedings, such as probate matters or adoptions, are not permitted to 
unilaterally change judges as a matter of right. The amendment is intended to eliminate the 
possibility of judge shopping in one-party actions. The Committee approved the proposed 
amendment as written notwithstanding the comment. 
SIMPLIFIED CIVIT PROCEDURES. 
vii Wtkstiom introduced wu topic ana expressed a ui MM 'hai UK. commitiei. icad-
consensus on a cogent, non-final set of proposed rules as the foundation for future discussion:. 
As an overview, the point of the simplified procedures is to lias e significant disclosure at the 
outset. Mr. Wikstrom expressed his belief that many cases would be trial-read) just upon the 
basis of initial disclosures, and without need of follow-up discovery, If not, the panic, would 
meet and try to agree on a discovery plan. Lawyers would be charged with preparing nd 
presenting to their clients a proposed budget for discovery, and with obtaining client a'»pro\ ai lor 
that budget. If the parties agree on (lie discovery schedule, the court shall approve, u he parties 
cannot agree, they would go to the court to set a discovery plan and schedule :OJL , I Milan and 
Judge Anderson expressed the view that it is best for the ennr? to have the benefit ol tKe earh 
disclosures for purposes of this conference. 
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Mr. Shea raised the is^n ni e.Nemp'j.--.*- irom Kuie jo(a; disclosures. I he cr~imittee 
agreed that the exemption for piu ae litigant- and amounts in controvers\ under $20,000 mu<\ he 
abolished, Mr. Shea raised the possibility of limiting subpoenas duces tecum. Th- e 'mmiiu\j 
declined to impose any limit in this regard. Mr. Shea then raised the issue ol clectr > v ally 
stored information and queried whether the rules should require a meeting to discu> -. 
preservation of this information. Mr. Wikstrom suggested that it one party believes the other 
party should be obligated to preserve evidence, that the onus is on the party believing electronic 
evidence exists to notify the other side. Mr. Shaughnessy suggested that the rule state that 
parties are under no obligation to alter existing document storage/destruction policies unless and 
until notified by the other side. The committee decided that, after a complaint is filed, if one 
party wants to preserve electronic evidence, that party must seek a meeting and try to reach an 
agreement as to scope of preservation. If the parties are unable to agree, that party can file a 
motion for preservation with the court. 
Mi-NT. 
The meeting adjourned a! S:00 \:.-„i. . IK OUutxr ;iu
 :.s. 
meeting will t I .;ild at 4:00 p.m. on Wednesday, Novembei io, zuuy i , \» 
Office of the Courts, 
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MISSOURI, PETITIONER v. GALIN E. FRYE 
i 
No. 10-444 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
2012 U.S. LEXIS 2321 
October 31,2011, Argued 
March 21,2012, Decided 
NOTICE: 
The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to 
change pending release of the final published version. 
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 
APPEALS OF MISSOURI, WESTERN DISTRICT. 
Frye v. State, 311 S W.3d350, 2010 Mo. App. LEXIS 353 
(Mo. Ct App., 2010) 
DISPOSITION: Vacated and remanded. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Respondent, who pleaded 
guilty to driving with a revoked license, filed a 
postconviction relief petition alleging that his counsel's 
failure to inform him of a plea offer denied him Sixth 
Amendment effective assistance of counsel. A state court 
denied the postconviction relief petition, but the Missouri 
Court of Appeals reversed. Petitioner, the State of Mis-
souri, sought review. The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. 
OVERVIEW: After being charged with driving with a 
revoked license, the prosecutor sent respondent's counsel 
two plea bargains. Respondent's counsel did not advise 
him of the offers, which-expired. Prior to the preliminary 
hearing, respondent was again arrested for driving with a 
revoked license. He pleaded guilty without an agreement. 
On review, the Court reaffirmed that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance applied to the entry of a 
guilty plea. The Court further held that defense counsel 
had a duty to communicate formal offers from the pros-
ecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that 
might be favorable to an accused; when counsel allowed 
the offer to expire without advising respondent or allow-
ing him to consider it, counsel did not render constitu-
tionally effective assistance. However, under Strickland, 
respondent had to show prejudice from the ineffective 
assistance. The Court concluded that the state appellate 
court erred by not requiring respondent to show not only 
a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the 
lapsed plea, but also a reasonable probability that the 
prosecution would have adhered to the plea and that the 
trial court would have accepted it. 
OUTCOME: In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court va-
cated the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. 1 dissent. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental 
Rights > Criminal Process > Assistance of Counsel 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective As-
sistance > General Overview 
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BLAINE LAFLER, PETITIONER v. ANTHONY COOPER 
i 
No. 10-209 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
4 
2012 U.S. LEXIS 2322 
October 31,2011, Argued 
March 21,2012, Decided 
NOTICE: 
The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to 
change pending release of the final published version. 
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. 
Cooper v. Lqfler, 376 Fed. Appx. 563, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 9589 (6th Cir.) (6th Cir. Mich., 2010) 
DISPOSITION: Vacated and Remanded. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Respondent state prison 
inmate rejected a plea bargain based on erroneous legal 
advice of counsel and was convicted at trial of all of-
fenses and received a much greater sentence than offered 
in the plea bargain. Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari, 
petitioner prison warden appealed the judgment of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which upheld 
a grant of a writ of habeas corpus based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
OVERVIEW: It was conceded that the inmate's counsel 
was deficient in providing erroneous legal advice con-
cerning the plea bargain, but the warden contended that 
the inmate sufferedpb prejudice because the inmate was 
properly convicted after a fair trial. The U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the inmate's fair trial did not preclude 
prejudice from counsel's ineffective assistance. The right 
to effective assistance of counsel was not solely to ensure 
a fair trial, and there was no indication that the fair trial \ 
cured counsel's error. Further, the inmate suffered preju-
dice rather than a windfall based on the likelihood that 
the outcome would have been different, since the inmate 
sought relief based on a failure to meet a valid legal 
standard rather than application of an incorrect legal 
principle. Also, a lack of prejudice could not be based on 
the reliability of the trial since the reliability of the pre-
trial bargaining, which caused the inmate to lose the 
benefits of the bargain, was the concern at issue. How-
ever, the appropriate remedy for counsel's error was to 
re-offer the plea bargain and conduct further proceedings 
in state court, rather than directing that the plea bargain 
be enforced. 
OUTCOME: The judgment upholding the grant of the 
writ of habeas corpus and directing that the plea bargain 
be enforced was vacated, and the case was remanded for 
remedial action. 5-4 Decision; 2 Dissents. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental 
Rights > Criminal Process > Assistance of Counsel 
Criminal Law ^Procedure > Counsel > Effective As-
sistance > Pleas 
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